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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper utilizes VAR techniques to examine the relationship between a policy related variable and 
selected macro-variables in China.  Johansen’s cointegration tests fail to find a moving equilibrium 
among the related variables. Based on a VAR model in first differences, we find that an unexpected 
temporary one-off shock to the change in the seven-day money market interbank borrowing rate  does not 
have significant influence on GDP changes but a significant influence on price level changes in a 
“wrong” direction. Empirical testing demonstrates that the seven-day Repo rate has an insignificant 
influence on both GDP changes and on the price level changes. Furthermore, the relationships between 
monetary aggregate (M2) and short-run money market interest rates suggest that the short-run interest 
rates do not have significant influence on the monetary aggregate. Therefore, we have determined that 
short-run money market interest rates are ineffective as a monetary policy-operating objective. 
 
JEL: E4, E5, E6 
 
KEYWORDS: monetary, money, macroeconomic policy 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
any studies have examined China’s monetary policy mechanism, focusing on the effectiveness 
of intermediate targets, M1 and M2.  For example, Xia and Liao (2001), Yu (2001), Xie (2004), 
and Geiger (2006, 2008) have argued that monetary aggregates (M1 and M2) are no longer 
suitable as intermediate targets, because the money multiplier is unstable and the monetary aggregates are 
not controllable by the nation’s monetary authority.  However, the optimal monetary policy target for 
China is debatable.  
  
According Kasman (1992)，Morton and Wood (1993), Borio (1997, 2001), and Ho (2008), all central 
banks in the industrialised countries currently implement monetary policy through market-oriented 
instruments geared to influence closely short-term interest rates as operating targets.  Ho’s (2008) 
research on emerging Asian countries confirmed a number of broad themes across central banks with 
respect to the main features of policy implementation: focusing on short-term money market interest rates 
as operating objectives, favouring averaging reserve requirements, using interest rate corridors with 
penalty rates, and searching for alternative instruments.  Therefore, the question of whether China’s 
central bank should switch to short-term interest rate as its operating objective has attracted scholarly 
attention (see Xie and Luo, 2002; Yang, 2002;  Xie and Yuan, 2003; Lu and Zhong, 2003; Wang and Zou, 
2006; Wu, 2008).  In regards to monetary theory, the precondition for adopting short-term interest rate as 
an operating instrument is that an effective an interest rate transmission mechanism established in a 
specific monetary framework and the operating objectives closely correlated to the final policy goal.  
However, whether short-run interest rates are highly correlated with China’s monetary policy goals – 
price stability and economic growth – remains ambiguous.  
 
M 
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This study uses Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) techniques to analyse the monetary transmission 
mechanism in China. Specifically, the study seeks to answer two questions: 
 
1. How does a monetary policy shock, defined as a temporary and exogenous change in the short-
term money market interest rate, affect real output, prices, and the nominal effective exchange 
rate?  
2. How much do variations in short-run interest rates account for fluctuations in output, price level, 
and the nominal effective exchange rate?  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes the introduction 
of the study followed by background information on China’s monetary framework and the 
literature review on monetary policy instruments. The data and research methodology present the 
empirical models and variables used in the study.  The empirical results section discusses the 
relationship between the monetary policy variables and both output and prices in China using a 
VAR analysis.  The last section concludes the paper. 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) states that the aim of monetary policies is to maintain stability in the 
value of the currency and thereby promote economic growth.  Therefore, the central bank is committed to 
two objectives: realizing price stability and promoting economic growth.  The PBC claims to pursue 
currency stability as the sole target of its monetary policy, but it is impossible to ignore the goal of 
economic growth given its decision process is not independent of the state council’s directives.  
 
Since exchange rate unification in 1994, China has maintained a manageable floating exchange rate 
regime, a de facto peg of the renminbi (RMB) to the US dollar (USD), with different floating bandwidths 
during different periods.  A crawling peg regime from 1994 to 1996 followed a de facto peg of the RMB 
against the USD with a trading band of 0.4 per cent (about RMB/USD 8.28).  The trading band tightened 
to 0.01 per cent around the parity of RMB/USD 8.277.  After an immediate appreciation of the RMB 
against the USD of around 2 per cent on July 21, 2005, China’s exchange rate regime changed a peg 
against a basket of currencies, with a fluctuation bandwidth up to 0.3 per cent of the previous day’s 
exchange rate (Anderson, 2005).  On May 21, 2006, the daily floating band of the RMB against the USD 
trading price expanded to 0.5 percent (People’s Bank of China, 2007).  Based on this account, one can 
conclude that another objective of China’s monetary policy is to maintain the stability of exchange rate 
vis-a-vis the USD.  
 
Concerns on the risks of financial sector reform have led to a gradual interest rates liberalization that took 
place relatively late in the course of economic reform.  The liberalization of the interest rates were 
announced in November 1993 at the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Communist Party Central 
Committee (CPCC).  The Party recognized that the central bank should promptly adjust the benchmark 
interest rates according to changes in market supply and demand. This allows the commercial banks to set 
their loans and deposits rates within a specific range.  In 2002, the Sixteenth National Congress reiterated 
the need to advance interest rates reforms and optimize financial resource allocation.  Furthermore, the 
Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee in 2003 argued the need to establish a robust 
mechanism for market-based interest rates and monetary policy actions consistent with the country’s 
economic objectives (Bernard and Maino, 2007).  
 
During the period 1986-1993, China’s policies included targets on currency in circulation and bank’s 
loans portfolios.  In September 1994, the PBC defined and announced three levels of money supply 
indicators; M0, M1, and M2. In 1996, the PBC formally treated money supply as an intermediate target.  
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The elimination of credit ceilings in 1998 left M2 (money supply) as the single major intermediate target.  
The theoretical assumptions underlying China’s monetary policy is that the objectives such as the GDP 
growth rate and the inflation rate correlate with the intermediate targets (money supply), that the 
intermediate targets are firmly connected to the monetary base. Equivalently, the money multiplier is 
assumed to be stable, and the central bank can influence intermediate targets by adjusting policy 
instruments.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Several scholars had devised classification schemes to describe the mechanism central banks have at their 
disposal for controlling financial activities. 
 
Bernard (2004) has noted that monetary policy instruments fall into two broad categories: rules-based 
instruments and monetary market operations.  The first category refers to the regulatory power of the 
central bank, which includes liquidity asset ratio, reserve requirements, and standing facility.  The second 
category, market operations, is used at the discretion of the central bank. These bear an interest rate linked 
to money market conditions and aim to influence the underlying demand and supply conditions of the 
central bank.  This includes open market–type operations, auction techniques, and fine–tuning operations 
(Bernard, 2004).  
 
Xie (2004) classified the PBC’s 13 monetary policy instruments into four categories relevant to 1983-
2002: (1) instruments with ratios such as required reserve ratios; (2) interest rates, such rediscount rates, 
central bank interest rates on reserve requirements, central bank lending rates, deposits and lending 
interest rates of financial institutions; (3) quantity instruments, such as central bank lending, open market 
operations (on treasury bonds and foreign exchange), rediscounting; and (4) other instruments, such as 
central bank bills, central bank bonds, special deposits to the central bank, standing facilities, and moral 
suasion.  
 
Geiger’s (2006, 2008) classification of the PBC’s monetary policy instruments is different from Xie’s 
classification.  He identifies two main categories of PBC’s instruments, price-based and quantity-based.  
Price-based instruments are indirect and incorporate PBC lending and deposit rates, discount and 
rediscount rate, reserve requirements, and open market operations (OMOs).  Quantity based instruments 
are direct and include window guidance, direct PBC lending, and capital control.  
 
Bernard and Maino (2007) summarized China’s main monetary policy instruments as standing facilities, 
OMOs, reserve requirements, interest rates control, window guidance, and other administrative measures.  
“The PBC has developed a set of monetary instruments which conform to best practices and which place 
the PBC in a relatively strong position to rely primarily on market-based instruments in the conduct of 
money policy.  Open market operations in the form of issuance of PBC bills play an important role in the 
sterilization of excess liquidity and reserve requirements provide important support to OMOs” (Bernard 
and Maino, 2007, pp. 14). 
 
Based on Bernard’s (2004) theoretical framework, we can conclude that the current choice of China’s 
monetary policy is a mix of rules-based instruments and money market operations.  In 1993, the PBC 
introduced the OMO into its monetary policy toolbox. Following the abolishment of the credit rationing 
policy in 1998, the OMOs became the PBC’s main monetary policy instrument.  The PBC benchmark 
lending rates - rediscount rates, the interest rate on required reserves, and excess reserves constitute an 
upper and a lower limit in the money market interest rates.  The central bank bill rates serves as a target 
rate in setting the money market interest rate, such as the federal fund rate in the U.S (Xie, 2004; Wu, 
2008).  Automatic collateralized lending and the excess reserves facility constitute China’s standing tools 
for monetary control. 
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Xie (2004) investigated the relationship between the monetary aggregate (M1, M2) and the monetary base, 
from the first quarter of 1994 through the fourth quarter of 2002.  The results of the quarterly cross-
correlation coefficients and Granger-causality tests for the base money and monetary aggregates indicate 
that the impact of the monetary base on M1 is not strong, and the impact of the monetary base on M2 is 
even weaker.  Among the four different liquidity injecting channels, namely, the PBC’s lending to 
financial institutions, foreign exchange purchase by the monetary authority, OMOs on treasury bonds, and 
the rediscount window, only the central bank lending Granger causes M1, and none Granger causes M2.  
Therefore, monetary aggregates are endogenously determined and have strong correlations with monetary 
policy.  
 
Xie (2004) also explored the dynamic relationships between monetary aggregates, economic growth, and 
inflation rates using data from the first quarter of 1992 to the third quarter of 2002.  The author argues 
that the money supply affects output and money is not neutral in the short run. Nevertheless, the impacts 
of money supply on output last no more than eleven quarters.  Money is neutral in long run and the 
impacts of money supply on output are not of a permanent nature. In both the short run and long run, 
money supply and inflation correlate, where changes in the money supply have permanent effects on the 
inflation rate and the price level.  Geiger (2006, 2008) documents severe deviations of the targeted and 
the actual values from 1994-2004 and 1994-2006.  
 
Table 1 compares the targeted with the actual values of China’s monetary aggregates, M1 and M2 from 
1994 to 2006.  The targeted and the actual values fell only three times in the case of M1, and four times in 
the case of M2. Strong deviations of more than four percentage points occurred several times for both M1 
and M2, and this raises the doubt on the controllability of the monetary aggregates.  
 
Table 1:  Targeted and Actual Values of PBC Monetary Aggregates (1994-2006) 
 
Year  M1 growth (per cent) M2 growth (per cent) 
 Target  Actual  Target  Actual  
1994 21 26.2 24 34.5 
1995 21-23 16.8 23-25 29.5 
1996 18 18.9 25 25.3 
1997 18 16.5 23 17.3 
1998 17 11.9 16-18 15.3 
1999 14 17.7 14-15 14.7 
2000 15-17 16 14-15 14.7 
2001 13-14 12.7 15-16 14.4 
2002 13 16.8 13 16.8 
2003 16 18.7 16 19.6 
2004 17 13.6 17 14.6 
2005 15 11.8 15 17.6 
2006 14 17.5 14 16.9 
This table shows the comparison of the targeted and the actual values of the China’s monetary aggregates of the M1 and M2 from 1994 to 2006 
(Geiger, 2008). 
 
The systematic liberalization of the interest rates involved the lifting of the restrictions on wholesale 
transactions followed by liberalization of the retail transactions. Interest rates on foreign currencies 
deposits and lending were eliminated before those for local currency (Bernard and Maino, 2007).  The 
reform on market interest rates progressed steadily from 1996.  By the end of 1999, the interbank 
borrowing rates, discount rates for commercial paper, and repos and spot trading rates in the interbank 
bond market were fully liberalized.  The purchasers’ bids determined the interest rates on policy financial 
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bonds and treasury bonds (Xie, 2004).  The PBC also adjusted the refinancing rate to a reference rate for 
the money market. 
  
Reform of the retail banking operations involved first allowing banks to price counterpart risks on 
customers within a floating margin before fully liberalizing the lending and deposit rates (Mehan, 
Quintyn, Nordman, and Laurens, 1996).  The authorities reduced the number of administered interest 
rates, adjusted bank lending rates on industrial and commercial enterprises more frequently to reflect 
changes in the PBC benchmark rate, and allowed financial institutions to price their lending operations 
within a floating margin.  The discretionary bands on lending rates expanded in 1998(Xie, 2004).  In 
October 2004, the PBC removed ceilings on lending rates and floors on deposit rates.  A floor for lending 
rates and a ceiling for deposit rates protect the banks’ intermediation margins.  The PBC reduced about 
120 administered interest rates from 1996 to 2007 (Wu, 2008).  
 
Both the depth and breadth of the money markets in China have improved significantly over the past 
decade.  Currently, China’s money market comprises of three sub-markets.  The first sub-market is the 
interbank money market. Originating in the 1980s and modified in 1993, a reformed and unified national 
interbank market started operation in January 1996, where banks lent and borrowed funds among 
themselves for terms from overnight to four months. The amount of lending and borrowing are fixed in 
proportion to the balance of deposits.  In contrast, non-bank financial institutions lend and borrow funds 
among themselves for a maximum of seven-days and the trading volumes depend on the capital level. The 
seven-day loan rate is the China’s inter bank offered rate (CHIBOR) (Xie, 2002).   
 
By the end of 2007, the number of market participants reached 717, fourteen times greater than when 
markets began operation. As of November 28, the trading volume reached RMB13,700 billion.  The 
interbank markets rules and regulations were enforced in August 2007. Stephen (2007a, 2007b) argues 
that the introduction of a more market driven reference rates such as the Shanghai interbank offered rate 
(SHIBOR) for the onshore money market is a critical step in terms in improving China’s money market.   
 
The second sub-market is the interbank bond market, which functions as a liquidity market.  The China 
inter-bank bond market began operation in June 1997.  By the end of 2007, the number of participants 
was 7095 (The People’s Bank of China Annual Report, 2007).  Both the turnover and the liquidity of the 
interbank bond market have expanded significantly, with a total turnover exceeding RMB100,000 billion 
in 2008. The tradable stocks increased from RMB72.3 billion in 1997 to RMB9,024 billion by June 2008 
(China Monetary Policy Report, 2008).  It is currently the biggest bond market in China.   
 
China’s interbank bond market currently has three characteristics added since its initial development. First, 
the trading participants in the interbank bond market is diversified by allowing non-banking financial 
institutions (such as funds companies, securities companies, and insurance companies) and other 
enterprises to trade in this market.  Second, with Treasury bonds and PBC bills as the main trading 
products, the debts issued by policy banks and commercial banks, and commercial papers issued by the 
financial companies and other big corporations have increased significantly.  Issuers of bonds in this 
market have included the Ministry of Finance, the central bank, policy banks, commercial banks, 
nonbanking financial institutions, and corporations.  The central bank uses the term structure of bond 
yields and long-term interbank rates as reference rates to predict inflation trends.  This also serves as an 
important basis for pricing other financial products through the market. 
 
Finally, the bond repo market, the third sub-market of the money market, is used for short-term borrowing.  
Turnover reached RMB51,580 billion by the end of November 2008.  Since 1997, the repo rate has been 
set by the market, with the most active contracts between one and seven days.  The seven-day repo in 
effect became the bond benchmark rate and it became the official reference indicator for the money 
market from October 12, 2004.  Because commercial banks, securities companies, and other financial 
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institutions trade in this market, frequent changes in the repo rate reflect changes in the stock and money 
loans markets (ChinaNet).  This market is less volatile and liquid than the CHIBOR and its successor 
SHIBOR.  Compared with interbank markets, repo markets are more active and the interest rates are more 
stable (Xie, 2002; Loretan and Wooldridge, 2008).   
 
The segmentation in the money markets is the result of regulations, because the initial operations of the 
money markets led to disorder in the financial industry in the early 1990s.  Instead of using it as a means 
to manage reserves by commercial banks, it is abused by both financial and other nonfinancial institutions 
to obtain short-term funds to invest in securities and real estate (Xie, 2002; Bernard and Maino, 2007).  In 
order to prevent bank funds being used to participate in the stock market, the PBC ruled that commercial 
banks would withdraw from repo trading on the stock exchange. Beginning in 1997, commercial banks 
were only allowed to carry out repo trading on the interbank market, with the goal of building a firewall 
between the money and capital markets (Xie, 2002; Bernard and Maino, 2007).  Short-term borrowing by 
securities companies in the interbank market led to contagion, as changing conditions in the capital 
market had a direct impact on the interbank markets.  From 2000, securities companies, funds 
management companies, and other non-banking financial institutions were permitted to trade into the 
inter-bank markets under certain conditions.  However, the coexistence of the interbank bond market and 
the stock exchange bond market, and the limits on RMB interbank market activity for commercial banks 
funded in foreign currencies remain the source of market segmentation (Wu, 2005; Bernard and Maino, 
2007).  
 
In 1994, China adopted a managed floating exchange rate regime against the USD, coupled with a move 
to partial convertibility on the current account (Zhang, 2001).  Further, in December 1996, China adopted 
current account convertibility, but maintained administrative controls on the capital account (Xie, 2004).  
Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China implemented a fixed foreign exchange regime. This was 
in place until July 2005, when they announced a switch to a new exchange rate regime.  The exchange 
rate would be set with reference to a basket of other currencies, with numerical weights unannounced.  
This allowed movement within any given day towards increased flexibility (Frankle, 2009).  However, 
some researchers argued that China’s current foreign exchange policy was still “fixed” instead of 
“floating” (see McKinnon and Schnabl, 2006; Frankle and Wei, 2007; Prasad, 2007).  
 
Previous studies argue that for one country unfettered movement of international capital, independent 
monetary policy and a fixed exchange rate policy cannot coexist.  In theory, capital controls can prevent 
large inflows (outflows) when domestic interest rates are higher (lower) than foreign rates.  This allows 
the PBC to operate an independent monetary policy.  In practice it is difficult to maintain effective capital 
controls over time, particularly in an economy like China’s, that is not only open to trade but trades 
extensively (Goldstein and Lardy, 2007; Wu, 2006).  With a large current account surpluses, the PBC 
faces the challenge of sterilizing the increase in the domestic money supply resulting from the large 
purchase of foreign exchange (i.e. sale of domestic currency).  
 
China’s balance of payments has remained strong since 1996, and its global current account surplus has 
expanded substantially over recent years.  The current account surplus was $72.4 billion in 1996, rising to 
$68.7 billion (3.6 percent of GDP) in 2004, $160.8 billion (7.2 precent of GDP) in 2005, and $371.8 
billion in 2007 (11.3 precent of GDP) (National Bureau of Statistics, 2008; IMF Statistic Database, 2007; 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange).  Since then, China’s account surplus (in absolute terms) is the 
largest of any country.  
 
The build-up of official holding of foreign exchange reserves has accelerated since 2005.  In the 12 
months from June 2005 to June 2006, the foreign exchange reserves rose by $240 billion and $230 billion, 
respectively (Goldstein and Lardy, 2007).  However, in the 12 months through June 2007, foreign 
exchange reserves rose by $391 million, about three-fifths more than in the previous two 12 month 
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periods,  In the 12 months through June 2008, the foreign exchange reserves rose by an astonishing $467 
billion.  At the end of September 2008, total foreign exchange reserves reached $1,905.5 billion (People’s 
Bank of China, 2008).  
 
Since the unification of China’s exchange rate in 1994, the RMB has been under pressure to appreciate, 
except during the 1997 Asian financial crisis year.  To maintain stability in the RMB, the PBC adopted 
several comprehensive measures.  These have included improving the foreign exchange purchase-and-
sale system via foreign exchange designed banks, changing interest rate policy and shifting to OMOs (Xie, 
2004).  Following 2000, the appreciation pressure was fueled by expanding capital inflows and foreign 
trade surpluses.  Thus, the PBC has more pressure to intervene in the market.  
 
Anderson (2004, 2005) and Stephen (2007a, 2007b) suggest that China can run an independent monetary 
policy under any foreign exchange regime and have little difficulty in retaining control of the growth of 
its domestic money supply.  They argue that this can be absorbed with relatively effective capital control 
and successful stabilization via the sale of central bank bills and an increase in the required reserve ratio 
for banks.  In contrast, Goldstein and Lardy (2006), Lardy (2006), and Prasad, Rumbaugh, Wang (2005) 
argue that China’s (quasi) fixed exchange rate has weakened the effectiveness of its monetary policy.  
They believe that the resulting policy mix has left China with an interest rate structure that is far from 
optimum.  Since a low real interest rate contributes to an underlying excess demand for credit and rapid 
growth of lending from banks, low deposit interest rates have been a major contributing factor to the 
boom in the property market.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This section examines the relationship between the monetary policy variables and both output and prices 
in China using VAR analysis.  Since Sims’s seminal paper in 1980, the VAR framework has been widely 
used in macroeconomics research as it allows the direct estimation of the joint stochastic process 
describing the variables under consideration.  If one is unclear on which variable is endogenous and 
which is exogenous, the VAR method allows the researcher to treat all variables as jointly endogenous.  
Researchers using VAR to identify transmission of monetary policy in advanced economies include 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2000) for the United States, Kim and Nouriel, (2000) for the G-7 
economies, and Peersman and Smets (2003) for the Euro area.  Armenia by Era and Holger (2007) and 
Kenya by Cheng (2006) use the VAR framework to study the monetary policy transmission mechanism in 
developing countries.  In this study, we use quarterly data from 1996:Q1 to 2008:Q1 to examine the 
macroeconomic dynamics of the unified interbank market operation in China.  We first test all time series 
for unit roots using the augmented Dickey-Fuller method, and then estimate a reduced form VAR, 
indentifying money policy shocks through the assumptions about variable ordering. 
 
Data and Variable Description 
 
First, we consider the effects of short-term interest rates on GDP, general price level, monetary aggregate, 
and exchange rates.  We assume the 7-day interbank money market rate (INTm), and the CHIBOR 
market’s benchmark, as the PBC’s policy stance (i.e., a 7-day repo rate (INTr), which is another 
benchmark short-term interest rates used in the interbank bond market).  Another policy-related variable 
in our study is the domestic monetary aggregate M2 (M), which is the intermediate target of the PBC.  
We use the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) to examine effects on output and prices.  The output 
measure is real GDP with the consumer price index (CPI) as the general price level.  All data are 
expressed in natural logs and are seasonally adjusted using ARIMAX12, with the exception of short-term 
interest rates.  Table 2 display the unit root tests for the time series.  The unit root tests show that INTm 
and INTr are trend stationary variables.  
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Table 2:  Unit Root Tests for Time Series 
 
Variable (C,T,K)          ADF-Statistic       1% critical value      5% Critical Value  P-Value 
GDP (C,0,1)  0.590  -3,563                -2.921  0.98 
CPI (C.0.0)  2.581  -3.5654              -2.919    1.00 
M (C,0,0)  -0.712  -3.565                -2.919  0.83 
INTm (C,0.0)  -3.962  -3.563***           -2.919  0.00 
INTm (C,T,0)  -1.709  -4.148                -3.500  0.73 
INTr (C,0.3)  -3.024  -3.605                -2.936**  0.04 
INTr (C,T,3)  -2.908  -4.205                -3.526  0.17 
NEER (C,0,1)  -0.474  -3.568                -2.921  0.88 
This table reports the unit root tests results. (C,T,K) indicates constant, trend, and lag-length included in the unit root test. The unit root tests 
show that INTm and INTr are trend stationary variables.  *** and ** stand for the significance at 1 and 5 percent respectively.  
 
The variables in the model should be stationary in displaying the relationships among the output, prices, 
and policy-related variables in a VAR.  However, the unit root tests show the instability of the time series 
used in our study.  Sims (1980) and Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) recommend against differencing 
when the related variables are cointegrated, even if the variables contain a unit root.  They argue that the 
goal of a VAR analysis is to determine the interrelationships among the variables, not to determine the 
parameter estimates.  Conducting the analysis in levels allow for implicit cointegration relationship in the 
data.  However, if the related )1(I  variables are not cointegrated, it is preferable to use the first difference.  
There are three consequences if the )1(I  variables are not cointegrated and one estimates the VAR in 
level.  The first consequence is the test loses its power because we estimate 2n  with more than one 
parameter.  The second is the test for Granger causality on the )1(I  variables, which do not have a 
standard F  distribution for a VAR in levels.  The last is when the VAR has )1(I  variables, the impulse 
responses at long forecast horizons are inconsistent estimates of the true response.  
 
Enders (2004) notes that the lag length test can be performed regardless of the variables in question are 
stationary or integrated.  Eviews 6 selects the lag length of the VAR model using the VAR lag order 
selection criteria.  All the information criteria select a lag order of one.  The residual test suggests that we 
can reject autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity at the conventional 5% significance level.  Based on the 
selected lag length, we perform two cointegration tests: one for the same five variables in the level VAR, 
and exclude the short-term interest rates in the second test.  The results show that when short-term interest 
rates are included into the VAR, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration (see table 3).   
 
Table 3:  Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
 
Variables: GDP, CPI, M, INTm, NERR (p=1) 
0H     Trace  5% Critical Value  Max-Eigen 5% Critical Value 
0r =     76.72   88.03    27.07   38.33 
Variable: GDP, CPI, M, NEER (p=1) 
0H     Trace  5% Critical Value  Max-Eigen 5% Critical Value 
or =     67.50   54.07    35.99   28.58 
This table reports two Johansen Cointegration test results, one for the five variables in the level VAR, excluding the short-term interest rate 
variable. 
 
In this study, we use the first order difference of the related variables to construct a VAR model.  The 
basic concepts underlying the VAR modelling process can be summarised as follows. 
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Let tY  be a 1×n  vector of variables, tε a 1×n  vector of mean zero structural innovations and 
p
p LBLBLBBLB −−−=
2
210)(  a  nn×  matrix polynomial in the lag operator. The pth  order 
structural VAR model is written as:  
tLB ε=)( ; Λ=
'
ttE εε ; 0
' =+ sttE εε ， 0≠∀                             (1) 
where Λ  is a diagonal matrix. 0B  is a non-singular normalized matrix with ones on the diagonal.  This 
matrix summarizes the contemporaneous relationships between the variables of the model.  Since the 
coefficients are the unknown and the variables have contemporaneous effects, we therefore transform 
equation (1) into a reduced form VAR:     
 
ttt YLAY µ+= )(  ;  ∑=
'
ttE µµ ;  0
' =+sttE µµ , 0≠∀                                       (2) 
 
where pp LALAALILBBLA −−−==
− 2
2
1
0 )()(  and tt B εµ
1
0
−= . 
The error terms tµ  are composites of the underlying shocks tε .  The model must be exactly or over-
identified in order to estimate the structural model.  In order to recover the structural parameters from the 
reduced form model, there must be the same number of parameters in 0B   and Λ  as there are inΣ , the 
covariance matrix of the reduced form.  Hamilton (1994) called this the order condition. 
 
Combining equation 1 and 2, the variance-covariance matrix, Σ  can be expressed as follows: 
 
'1
0
1
0 )()(
−− Λ=Σ BB                                                                      (3) 
 
Consistent estimates of F  ( 0BF = ) and Λ can be obtained through the sample estimation ofΣ , which 
can be obtained by maximum likelihood estimation.  The right hand side of equation (3) contains 
)1( +× nn  parameters to be estimated, while the left-hand side contains only 2/)1( +× nn  parameters; 
we need 2/)1( +× nn  restrictions to achieve identification.  If the n  diagonal elements of Λ  are set to 
one, all that is required is a further 2/)1( +× nn   restrictions on B .  There are only a few methods to 
recover the parameters of the structural form from the parameters in the reduced form.  The most widely 
used approach in recursive VAR models is the Cholesky decomposition (Don and O’Reilly, 2004; Cheng, 
2006).  
 
The vector of endogenous variables in our benchmark model, equation (4),  consists of real GDP (GDP), 
the consumer price index (CPI), monetary aggregate (M), interbank market borrowing rate (INTm), and 
nominal effective foreign exchange rate (NEER).  We replaced interbank market bond repurchase rate 
(INTr) with INTm in equation (5) to test the robustness of our results.  
 
[ ]NEERINTmMCPIGDPYt ,,,,=                                          (4) 
[ ]NEERINTrMCPIGDPYt ,,,,=                                          (5) 
 
Equation (4) shows the ordering of the variables.  Intuitively, we assumed that prices (CPI) have no 
immediate effects on output (GDP), money stock (M) has no immediate effect on prices, monetary policy 
shock (INTm) has no immediate effect on the money stock, and the nominal effective exchange rate 
(NEER) has no immediate effect on the money policy.  Technically, this amounts to first estimating the 
reduced form of the benchmark model equation (4), then computing the Cholesky factorization of the 
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reduced form VAR covariance matrix.  In other words, the relations between the reduced form errors and 
the structural disturbances are given as follows: 
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The standard practice in VAR analysis is to report results from Granger-causality tests, impulse responses, 
and forecast error variance decompositions (Stock and Watson, 2001).  Because of the complicated 
dynamics in the VAR, these statistics are more informative than are the estimated VAR regression 
coefficients or  2R  statistics, which typically go unreported (Stock and Watson, 2001).  Granger-causality 
statistics examine whether the lagged values of one variable help to predict another variable.  Table 4 
summarizes the Granger-Causality results for the five-variable VAR and shows the P -values associated 
with the F -statistics for testing whether the relevant sets of coefficients are zero. 
 
Table 4: VAR Granger-Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
 
Dependent Variable in Regression 
                     ————————————————————————————— 
Regressor  ∆GDP  ∆CPI  ∆M2  ∆INTm  ∆NEER  
∆GDP    0.56                             0.74 0.20  0.86 
∆CPI  0.45    0.51    0.29  0.37 
∆M  0.21      0.95      0.07*  0.55 
∆INTm  0.61  0.06*   0.90    0.49 
∆NEER  0.84  0.01**  0.86     0.71   
This table summarizes the Granger-Causality results for the five-variable VAR. * and ** indicates significance level of 10 and 1 percent levels 
respectively. 
 
The result shows increases in the growth rate of INTm and NEER were significant to predict the CPI 
growth rate at 10% and 1% significance levels respectively, but did not Granger-cause GDP.  An increase 
in the growth rate of the monetary aggregate Granger-causes the growth rate of INTm at the 10% 
significance level, but not vice versa.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Impulse responses trace out the response of current and future values for each of the variables to a one-
unit increase in the current value of one of the VAR errors. This assumes that errors return to zero in 
subsequent periods and that all other errors are equal to zero (Stock and Watson, 2001).  In other words, 
the interpretation of the impulse response requires that the innovations be contemporaneously 
uncorrelated across equations.  However, the innovations in a VAR are correlated and may be viewed as 
having a common component, which cannot be associated with a specific variable (Eviews 6).  Thus, we 
use the inverse of the Cholesky factor of the residual covariance matrix to orthogonalize the impulses.  
 
Figure 1 presents the impulse response functions, showing the impact of a one-off rise in the INTm 
growth rate on output, prices, monetary aggregate and exchange rate.  The dotted lines represent the 95% 
confidence levels and the impact of a unit rise in the growth rate of monetary aggregate on other variables.  
Output growth rate changes by about 0.4%, peaking at the second quarter and vanishing completely at the 
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seventh quarter following the monetary contraction. The CPI growth rate changes by about 0.2%, peaking 
at the second quarter and decreasing to below 0.1% at the fifth quarter after contraction.  The response of 
the monetary aggregate growth rate to the interest rate growth shock appears to be insignificant.  However, 
an inspection of these impulse response functions shows that the response functions of GDP growth rate 
and CPI growth rate are inconsistent with what we expected to be the effects of a contraction in monetary 
policy.  Only the impulse response function of the nominal effective exchange rate appeared to be 
consistent with the theoretical prediction that an increase in the interest rate growth rate leads to an 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, but is statistically insignificant.   
 
Furthermore, we examine the impacts of the shocks of monetary aggregate growth rate on the other 
variables.  A rise in a one-unit monetary aggregate growth rate results in a 1% decline in GDP growth rate, 
reaching the trough at the second quarter and reverting to 0.5% at the peak of third quarter.  An increase 
in monetary aggregate leads to a decline in real GDP within two quarters, and then promotes economic 
growth with four to six quarters’ lag.  There is an insignificant impact on both the CPI and NEER growth 
rates.  However, the impact on the short-term interest rate is significant at the 10% level after one quarter.  
 
The forecast error decomposition is the percentage of the variance of the error made in forecasting a 
variable due to a specific shock at a given horizon (Stock and Watson, 2001).  The relative importance of 
monetary policy fluctuations in the other variables can be measured through variance decomposition.  
Table 5 reports the variance decomposition of the five VAR, variables covering 1 to 12 quarters.  The 
second column in each sub-table shows the forecast errors of the variable for each forecast horizon.  The 
remaining columns present the percentage of the variance due to the shock of the variable appearing as 
the column heading, with each row adding up to 100.   The results show that innovations in INTm growth 
rate account for about 0.34 percent of the forecast error variance in the output growth rate and about 9 
percent in the price level growth rate in a year.  Innovations in the monetary aggregate growth rate 
explain about 3.24 percent of the output growth rate forecast error, and only about 0.1 percent in the price 
level growth rate.  The innovations of money supply growth rate and interest growth rate explain each 
other, at about 4.7 and 0.1 precent respectively. Our results confirm the insignificant influence of changes 
in short-run interbank bank borrowing interest rate on GDP growth rate, and the statistically significantly 
influence on price level growth rate, but in the “wrong” direction.  This further confirms that monetary 
aggregate growth rates have no influence on both the GDP and price level fluctuations.  Another 
interesting result is that shocks to the monetary aggregate growth rate, which significantly influence the 
INTm change rate rather than the reverse.  
 
Figure 2 displays the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks defined as temporary, unexpected and 
exogenous rises in Repo growth rate, with the variance decomposition of the forecast errors shown in 
Table 6.  The results support our conclusion.  For a one-unit rise in Repo growth rate, the GDP growth 
rate rises by about 0.4% at the second quarter peak and decreased to 0.08% in the fourth quarter; the CPI 
growth rate rose at the peak by 0.2% in the second quarter. The directions of the changes are similar to 
those in the benchmark VAR.  Within one year, the innovations in the Repo growth rate explained about 
0.35 percent of the GDP growth rate forecast error and about 7.7 percent for the price level growth rate 
forecast error.  However, the impact of the Repo and monetary aggregate on GDP is statistically 
insignificant  
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Figure 1: Impulse Response in Recursive VAR 
 
 
 
This figure shows the impulse response functions showing the impact of a one-off rise in INTm growth rate on output, prices, monetary aggregate 
and exchange rate, with the dotted lines representing 95% confidence level and the impact of a unit rise in the growth rate of monetary aggregate 
on other variables. 
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Table 5:  Variance Decomposition (Percent of Total Variance) 
 
 Variance Decomposition of GDPA 
 Period S.E. GDPA CPIA M2A INTMA NEERA 
 1  0.067191  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 4  0.077274  95.61735  0.747174  3.247708  0.337880  0.049888 
 8  0.077403  95.55325  0.755237  3.277852  0.359609  0.054049 
 12  0.077405  95.55067  0.755621  3.277949  0.361010  0.054747 
 Variance Decomposition of CPIA 
 Period S.E. GDPA CPIA M2A INTMA NEERA 
 1  0.008903  1.015293  98.98471  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 4  0.009952  1.899751  81.56250  0.100684  8.907859  7.529210 
 8  0.010235  1.914807  78.09226  0.128086  10.33863  9.526215 
 12  0.010288  1.917015  77.46623  0.130873  10.55684  9.929040 
 Variance Decomposition of M2A 
 Period S.E. GDPA CPIA M2A INTMA NEERA 
 1  0.009551  0.308828  1.161612  98.52956  0.000000  0.000000 
 4  0.009617  0.678184  1.982264  97.19940  0.107697  0.032459 
 8  0.009620  0.685572  1.988073  97.15250  0.133768  0.040086 
 12  0.009620  0.685725  1.988910  97.14739  0.136041  0.041934 
 Variance Decomposition of INTMA 
 Period S.E. GDPA CPIA M2A INTMA NEERA 
 1  0.389118  0.700276  0.140861  0.108984  99.04988  0.000000 
 4  0.505393  3.529952  3.985635  4.734654  87.66348  0.086276 
 8  0.512978  3.528730  4.259895  4.819651  87.29407  0.097652 
 12  0.513331  3.529012  4.276629  4.819884  87.26525  0.109224 
 Variance Decomposition of NEERA 
 Period S.E. GDPA CPIA M2A INTMA NEERA 
 1  0.004518  0.283709  5.497382  0.090923  1.655793  92.47219 
 4  0.007174  0.545544  10.47459  0.265867  5.794468  82.91954 
 8  0.007993  0.731029  11.54858  0.218461  8.591484  78.91045 
 12  0.008165  0.777887  11.77393  0.215670  9.328558  77.90395 
This table shows the variance decomposition of the five variables VAR covering 1 to 12 quarters.  The second column in each sub-table shows the 
forecast errors of the variable for each forecast horizon.  The remaining columns present the percentage of the variance due to each shock, with 
each row adding up to 100. 
 
 Table 6:  Variance Decomposition of VAR (Repo) 
 
 Variance Decomposition of GDPA: 
 Period S.E. GDPA CPIA M2A INTRA NEERA 
 1  0.071468  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 4  0.082012  94.62480  1.382626  3.424394  0.355899  0.212286 
 8  0.082096  94.59207  1.390798  3.435846  0.359099  0.222188 
 12  0.082097  94.58933  1.391206  3.435795  0.359456  0.224209 
 Variance Decomposition of CPIA: 
 Period S.E. GDPA CPIA M2A INTRA NEERA 
 1  0.009595  1.302966  98.69703  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 4  0.010676  1.775495  81.55952  1.970865  7.730516  6.963607 
 8  0.010884  1.730996  79.14847  1.915285  8.505136  8.700115 
 12  0.010921  1.723015  78.72026  1.905542  8.610425  9.040754 
 Variance Decomposition of M2A: 
 Period S.E. GDPA CPIA M2A INTRA NEERA 
 1  0.008841  0.701716  0.345849  98.95243  0.000000  0.000000 
 4  0.008876  0.762420  0.413269  98.41496  0.037637  0.371711 
 8  0.008882  0.762074  0.425920  98.30062  0.048837  0.462552 
 12  0.008883  0.761997  0.429913  98.27425  0.054278  0.479562 
 Variance Decomposition of INTRA: 
 Period S.E. GDPA CPIA M2A INTRA NEERA 
 1  0.352308  0.308717  0.466141  1.921718  97.30342  0.000000 
 4  0.413797  2.023479  5.832656  1.886932  89.95875  0.298180 
 8  0.415126  2.024507  5.909361  1.876778  89.88886  0.300489 
 12  0.415136  2.024533  5.909992  1.876696  89.88830  0.300480 
 Variance Decomposition of NEERA: 
 Period S.E. GDPA CPIA M2A INTRA NEERA 
 1  0.004997  0.453490  6.613098  0.393814  17.40211  75.13749 
 4  0.007863  0.405743  11.70457  0.392003  17.68611  69.81157 
 8  0.008662  0.421778  12.40114  0.407970  18.38188  68.38723 
 12  0.008814  0.425498  12.52219  0.410484  18.52898  68.11285 
This table 6 shows the variance decomposition of the forecast error in the VAR.  The results shows a one-unit rise in Repo growth rate, the GDP 
growth rate rises by about 0.4% at the peak at the second quarter and decreases to 0.08% in the fourth quarter; the CPI growth rate rises at the 
peak by 0.2% in the second quarter. 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
This study examines the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy in China, based on a VAR 
framework.  Our findings suggest that level moving equilibrium did not exist among short-term money 
market interest rates, monetary aggregate, nominal effective exchange rates, and macro-economy 
variables (GDP and price level). However, in a differenced VAR, an exogenous, unexpected and 
temporary rise in the growth rate of money market short-term interest rates shows insignificant effect on 
the change rates of the real GDP and the price level.  The impulse response functions and variance 
decompositions show that short-term money market interest change move along with money aggregate 
change rate, not the reverse.  These findings show that under the current monetary aggregate targeting 
regime in China, a move in the short-term money market interest rate has not been able to reflect the 
changes in macro-economy variables.  In other words, the response of the central bank’s benchmark 
interest rate to macro-economy fluctuations fails to transfer effectively to the money market.  The weak 
link between the short-term interest rate and the macro-economy variable implies that China cannot use 
the short-term money market interest rate as it operation target.  An institutional reason for this failure is 
the existence of two cut-off separate interest rate systems: the central bank interest rate system and the 
commercial bank loan and deposit interest rates system.   
 
After 2003, the PBC has adopted a contractionary monetary policy, namely, increasing the central bank 
bills to reduce the money supply. Therefore, the PBC could not influence the money market short-run 
interest rate.  In this situation, the interest rate on the central bank bills rather than the money market 
interest rate, acts as the central bank target interest rate (Wu, 2008).  To switch to an official interest rate 
as a policy instrument and to adopt a short-term money market rate as operation target, China needed first 
to establish an effective interest rate transmission channel, so that the PBC can effectively influence the 
short-term money market rate through OMOs. 
 
It should be noted that the sample size in the study is not particularly large, which may limit the 
robustness of the tests and estimates presented here.  The small sample has also prevented a reliable 
structural break analysis when it comes to cointegration testing.  Therefore, future research that addresses 
similar issues should conduct with a sufficiently large sample so that one can investigate if structural 
breaks have taken place, and, if they have, what are their impacts on the long-run relationships between 
the variables.  
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Figure 2: Response Impulse in the Recursive VAR (Repo) 
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This figure shows impulse responses to a monetary policy shocks defined as a temporary, unexpected and exogenous rises in Repo growth rate 
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